Chapter 19

Governance of the "Big Five" International Organizations Concerned with Food Security and Nutrition*

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Since 2015, when the global community adopted the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Climate Change Accord, the financial resources needed to achieve global development goals have far exceeded current financial flows. Indeed, the World Bank/IMF Development Committee noted in April 2015 that the world needs to move from billions to trillions of financing in order to meet the challenge of promoting inclusive, sustainable growth, reducing poverty and inequality, and protecting the planet (Development Committee, 2015). Multilateral Development Banks have pledged to catalyze more investment from private investors and other sources of capital such as pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and insurance companies. They have proposed to leverage their capital base by borrowing from capital markets to increase their ability to finance development. They are also working towards catalyzing greater private investment by: (1) promoting high quality investment projects; (2) helping mitigate risk associated with investments; (3) mobilizing resources from and co-investing with traditional investors and through new sources of commercial financing for development; and (4) developing new financial products to help unlock additional flows (World Bank, 2017).

*This chapter is based on Lele *et al*. (2019).

The big five (the World Bank Group, FAO, World Food Program, IFAD, and CGIAR) are "operating arms" of global governance of food security and nutrition. Although collectively they constitute the largest sources of multilateral public finance provided globally in support of food and agricultural development, in 2016–2017 they were part of the near trillion dollars flowing to developing countries annually including private capital (US$422 billion) and remittances (US$407 billion) and "multi-bi" assistance of about US$21 billion.

The total financial contribution of the big five to food and agriculture is not easy to measure. They perform very different functions and their fiscal years vary. The World Bank Group and IFAD provide loans and grants to developing countries. WFP provides food and cash assistance to the most needy, CGIAR conducts research and FAO is a platform for setting norms and standards, generates knowledge products and provides technical assistance. In total, their annual expenditures/commitments amounted to about US$17 billion during 2016–2017. The global institutions reviewed in this chapter also bring to bear a vast range of knowledge and technical expertise; provide international platforms for member countries to discuss policy issues; and serve as a vehicle for formal and informal international agreements on norms, standards, and good practices to further food security. Governance through the big five entails strategic direction, oversight on the use of resources, provision of global public goods, country assistance, institutional and human capital/capacity development, and current and future resource mobilization strategies. Regional Development Banks provide a small amount of finance for agriculture and hence are not included in this chapter.[1]

This chapter discusses the changing role of the big five institutions since they were established, their governance, collaboration among them, and the process of evaluating their efficiency and effectiveness and implications going forward.

The World Bank Group (WBG)

One of the major achievements of the World Bank Group (WBG) in 2017 was obtaining the largest replenishment of its concessional window IDA 18 to the tune of US$75 billion over the 2018–2021 period. Efforts to obtain an IBRD capital increase were underway at the time of writing this chapter. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), was created as a result of the Bretton Woods agreements in 1944, and commenced operations in 1946. Together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it was one of the core institutions originally established for economic recovery in war torn

[1]The African Development Bank (AfDB); the Asian Development Bank (AsDB); the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

countries after World War II. Developing country members invited to participate in the conference leading to the formation of the Bretton Woods institutions urged the United States and United Kingdom, among the victors of the War, that the World Bank consider inclusion in the scope of its operations, beyond reconstruction, the needs of developing countries, to address problems of international capital market failures. Hence the original name of the World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Four additional agencies, created between 1957 and 1988, constitute the other institutional components of the current WBG: the International Finance Corporation (IFC); the International Development Association (IDA); the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The current mission of the WBG focuses on poverty reduction and economic development in developing countries.

The IBRD lends to governments of middle-income and creditworthy low-income countries; the IDA provides highly concessional loans (credits) and grants to the poorest countries; the role of the IFC is to provide and mobilize capital for the private sector in developing countries; the MIGA provides political risk insurance to international private sector investors and lenders to developing countries; and the ICSID provides facilities for conciliation and arbitration of international investment disputes. For fiscal year 2018 (July–June) and beyond, annual bond issuance is expected to be around US$50–55 billion. As of June 30, 2017, the amount of total borrowings outstanding was US$207 billion.

With the exception of the ICSID, each of the institutions in the WBG is owned by shareholders who are sovereign governments. They provide the basic share capital; country shares of the total capital determine voting shares on the Boards of Directors for each of the organizations.

The unique strength of the WBG is its ability to provide a full menu of services and support, ranging from global knowledge, analytical studies and technical assistance, to financing and project implementation support, to convening of partnerships, and marshaling contributions from diverse partners from the public and private sectors to further economic development. In 2008, a package of reforms, initiated after the global financial crisis, focused on improving governance through changes in the Bank Group's shareholding, its responsiveness, and representation on the Board. The share of funding by Developing and Transition Countries (DTCs) in the IBRD was increased to 45.8%, a more proactive stance was adopted in sub-Saharan Africa through the Bank's field presence, and the size of the Board was increased from 24 to 25 seats (compared to 12 at its inception in 1945) with the one additional seat allocated to the sub-Saharan African region. IFC reforms increased capital by US$200 million and the share of DTCs from 33.41% to 39.41%.

The "voice" in the governance of the WBG (i.e., the influence that countries have on the strategic direction and activities of the Group) is determined, among other things, by member countries' funding share according to their subscribed capital.[2] The modified Shareholding arrangements accommodate the rapid economic growth in emerging countries, particularly China, but as many analysts argue, is nowhere near reflecting its economic power. The US voting share, still the largest in the Bank, stood at 15.4% in 2017 compared to 35% at the Bank's inception. The United States provides one of five Executive Directors appointed by the major shareholders (in line with the Articles) and has effective veto power on all policies of importance to the institution, including the Bank's capitalization (Kapur *et al*., 1997; Gwin, 1997). Most decisions are made by consensus and formal votes are rarely taken. Through bilateral consultations between the shareholders and Bank management, the wishes of major shareholders are often taken into account before matters are brought before the Boards for consideration.

Periodic shareholding reviews are a way for the Bank to maintain legitimacy and dynamism and to reflect global economic changes in IBRD and IFC shareholding. But these strengths have been underutilized in a rapidly changing world, in part because major shareholders have been reluctant to make the transition to turn the Bank into a "real bank" i.e., increasing subscriptions by emerging countries (which they are willing to provide) in line with their increasing importance in the global economy, providing increased access to capital by developing countries, and enhancing their voice in the governance of the World Bank Group (see below for further discussion of this issue in the context of leadership selection).

An underlying theme of recent reforms has been the need to root the discussions of shareholding structure and voting power, along with the conceptually separate but linked issue of the size of the capital base, to a clear shared vision of the role of the World Bank Group, in the context of the complex and evolving development landscape. This vision is still being debated internally and externally. It is instructive to recall that Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the BRICS) established their own Bank, now called the New Development Bank (NDB) through an agreement signed in July 2014 with a commitment to a capital base of US$100 billion. Headquartered in Shanghai, the NDB was formally launched in July 2015. Leaders of the BRICS have emphasized that the new bank's mission is to mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing economies.

[2]For example in the case of the IBRD each member receives votes consisting of share votes (one vote for each share of the Bank's capital stock held by the member) plus basic votes (calculated so that the sum of all basic votes is equal to 5.55% of the sum of basic votes and share votes for all members). (See http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/votingpowers).

China led the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Launched in October 2014, the AIIB focuses on the development of infrastructure and other sectors in Asia, including energy and power, transportation and telecommunications, rural infrastructure and agriculture development, water supply and sanitation, environmental protection, urban development, and logistics. The AIIB currently has 80 approved members, including 24 prospective members. The membership includes several advanced European and Asian economies, such as France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. The relationship between the new multilateral banks and the traditional ones reviewed here is still evolving (Congressional Research Service, 2017).

The US government initially opposed the establishment of the AIIB, although 19 European countries agreed to join (in addition to Australia and New Zealand), but both the United States and Europe have been cool to the idea of expansion of the influence of emerging economies in the World Bank to avoid reducing their collective voice.[3] US conservatives have also been opposed to middle-income developing countries having access to official finance, since they can access international finance from commercial sources. The original purpose of establishing the World Bank was to address market failure in access to capital. The Meltzer Commission established in 1998 by the US Congress suggested that the Bank should phase out loans to middle-income countries and give grants to low-income countries (Meltzer, 2000), causing considerable distress among World Bank supporters.

Those in favor of lending to middle-income countries (including the countries themselves) make several arguments in support of the current arrangement: (1) nearly three quarter of the world's poverty and hunger is in middle-income countries although, many (e.g., China and Indonesia) have had considerable success in bringing down the number of poor people; (2) they have been good borrowers and present a lower risk of loan defaults, and the Bank needs a balanced portfolio of weak and strong borrowers to be able to maintain its high credit ratings and low interest rates when borrowing from the international bond market; and (3) they offer important development lessons for countries lagging in development. The same issue has become important in discussions of the recapitalization of the World Bank under the current US administration. If the World Bank does not continue to grow to meet the needs of middle-income countries it will fade into irrelevance, particularly with the growing role of China and other emerging countries in international finance.

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[3]The European countries involved are Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

It is worth noting that in the Board of the IBRD the top 25 member countries have 73.5% of the voting allocation and the remaining 164 member countries have only 26.5%[4]; a situation which is typical of other IGOs.

The IDA, IFC, and MIGA each have slightly different voting structures (for details see Lele *et al*., 2019). The IBRD and IDA are a single institution known as the World Bank and operate under similar rules. The IDA is funded using 3-year replenishments from member governments. In 2016, IDA raised its largest replenishment of US$75 billion over 3 years. Out of the 75 countries that are eligible to receive IDA support, 31 countries are fragile and conflict-affected with weak institutions and governance deficits.[5]

As of July 2017, 35 countries had graduated from IDA, i.e., become ineligible for IDA support due to average per capita gross national income (GNI) in excess of a poverty threshold. India graduated in 2014 and Bolivia, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam graduated at the end of 2017, although these three countries will continue to receive transitional support on an exceptional basis through the IDA18 period (FY2018–2020). Countries that graduate are only eligible for IBRD loans. Since the IDA's founding, 44 countries have graduated but nine subsequently reentered ("reverse graduated") due to reductions in their per capita income. Lending terms are determined with reference to recipient countries' risk of debt distress, the level of GNI per capita, and creditworthiness for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) borrowing. Recipients with a high risk of debt distress receive 100% of their financial assistance in the form of grants and those with a medium risk of debt distress receive 50% in the form of grants. Other recipients receive IDA credits on regular or blend and hard-terms with 40-year and 25-year maturities, respectively.

The review of IDA 18 explains the way countries are classified into: (1) IDA-only non-gap to IDA-only gap: countries that have been above the IDA operational cut off for more than 2 years but are not yet deemed credit worthy for IBRD financing are classified as "gap" countries; (2) IDA-only non-gap or IDA-only gap to blend: a positive credit worthy assessment by IBRD leads to reclassification of a country from IDA-only non-gap or IDA-only gap status to blend status (IDA/IBRD). The shift to blend status rarely occurs before a country reaches the IDA operational cut off and IDA-only gap status. Once a country becomes blend, IBRD financing is phased in while IDA financing is gradually phased out; and (3) blend to IBRD-only: the process concludes with

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[4]World Bank. "Voting Powers." as of March 29, 2017. http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/votingpowers.

[5]World Bank: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/189701503418416651/FY18FCSLIST-Final-July-2017.pdf.

reclassification from blend status to IBRD-only, with no access to new IDA resources. The graduation process normally starts once a country is assessed as credit worthy and its income per capita has been above IDA's operational cut off for at least 3 years. The actual "readiness" to graduate to IBRD-only status is based on an assessment of a country's macroeconomic prospects, risk of debt distress, vulnerability to shocks, external debt and liquidity, political stability, levels of poverty and social indicators. On average, IDA countries remain in blend status for approximately two IDA Replenishment cycles. Graduation is usually set to occur at the end of an IDA Replenishment period (World Bank, 2016). "Graduation" of countries from highly concessional multilateral finance is changing the context, together with significant re-set of the multilateral development finance system, while grant funding from traditional donors is generally in decline.

Leveraging IDA's equity and using the proceeds to provide additional non-concessional financing to IDA gap and blend countries is a potential new way of smoothing the path toward graduation. Countries graduating from IDA face a number of challenges: loss of access to concessional resources, a possible decline in overall World Bank support, and potential triggering of IDA's credit acceleration clause, which may result in negative net transfers to the World Bank. Non-concessional IDA financing could help maintain IDA's ability to tackle pockets of poverty, smoothing the sudden potential decline in access to World Bank resources faced by some IDA graduates, and softening the trajectory of negative net transfers.

In March 2017, the top 25 countries had 73% of the IBRD shares of subscriptions and votes. The remaining 164 member countries had 27% of the voting share. China has 3.4% of the IBRD voting shares. In the case of IDA, the shares are little more equally distributed, as many developing countries, some of which are previous recipients of IDA, also contribute to IDA.

Emerging countries, China in particular, have expressed a strong interest in expanding the World Bank's capital base and many are willing and able to increase their contributions. But expanding the subscribed capital will open the issue of increasing the role of developing countries in the Bank's governance. European donors have resisted reductions in their shares and the members of the European Union have resisted being represented by a single representative. This also affects leadership issues.

IDA contributions are more diversified. Roughly 53% of IDA contributions come from developed countries. The rest are from emerging and transition countries.

Since the establishment of the Bretton Woods Institutions, it was agreed that in the case of the World Bank, the United States would nominate an American candidate for the position of President after informal consultations with other shareholders. European countries nominate a candidate for the IMF Managing Director position. There has been much debate about selection based on objective eligibility criteria regardless of nationality, but change has not materialized. A recent concern is that the US Congress may lose interest in financing the World Bank and IDA if the World Bank Group were to be headed by a non-US national.

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

The FAO, a specialized agency of the United Nations, was established in October 1945. Its current work focuses on five priority areas: (1) elimination of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition; (2) making agriculture, forestry and fisheries more sustainable; (3) reducing rural poverty; (4) enabling inclusive and efficient agricultural and food systems; and (5) increasing the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises.[6] The FAO has a role in offering practical on-the-ground advice and capacity building, and in setting goals with respect to achieving global objectives, such as the reduction of hunger, although hunger reduction has been less successful than poverty reduction (Figures 19.1 and 19.2).

The FAO-organized World Food Summit definition of food security was modified only slightly in 2009 by adding the phrase "social" to the 1996 definition: "Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (FAO, 2009, p. 1).

FAO was also instrumental in the establishment of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in 2000, one of which was halving the number of people who suffer from hunger by the year 2015. Following the adoption of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, the FAO has been designated the "custodian" for 21 SDG indicators and is a key contributor to six more. This significant expansion in scope may be compared to the four indicators for which FAO was responsible in the MDGs. The 27 indicators are related to 7 SDGs: SDG 1 (no poverty); SDG 2 (zero hunger); SDG 5 (gender equality); SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation); SDG 12 (responsible consumption and production); SDG 14 (life below water); and SDG 15 (life on land) (FAO, 2017). Going beyond SDG indicators, FAO provides data and statistical support to some 200 countries (FAO, 2017), performing these functions on a small budget of US$500 million annually in assessed contributions and slightly higher amounts in voluntary contributions, as outlined below.

At the same time, reflecting the tension between many Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and inter-governmental organizations, 1,200 CSOs from 80 countries

[6]FAO: What We Do. http://www.fao.org/about/what-we-do/en/.

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

Figure 19.1. Poverty in developing regions has declined rapidly: Performance and projections by region, 1990–2030.

Notes: Poverty estimates based on US$1.90 per capita income per day poverty line and 2011 PPP prices. Given the production lags for household surveys, 2012 is the latest year for which the World Bank is able to produce regional and global poverty estimates. All numbers for 2015 and 2030 are statistical projections based on a growth scenario that assumes each country grows at the country-specific average growth rate observed over 2004–2013, and using distributional assumptions, and should be treated with considerable circumspection. See also Ferreira *et al*. (2015).

Source: Authors’ construction. Based on data from Cruz *et al.* (2015).



Figure 19.2. FAO reported estimates of hunger and projections show slower decline in hunger than in poverty: Performance and projections by region, 1990–2050.

Note: 2050 data from Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012).

Source: Authors’ construction. Based on data from FAO (2017a).

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called on governments — and the FAO — to do more to protect the "Right to Food" of the poor.[7] FAO's medium-term plan for 2018–2021 places emphasis on continuity in strategic direction and alignment between its strategic objectives and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with a planned contribution to 15 of the 17 SDGs. The plan seeks to strengthen program delivery on several fronts: enhancing the internal management arrangements for leadership of the strategic programs; upgrading the monitoring system for program delivery and results; and rationalizing and streamlining the organizational capacity to ensure optimal use of the Organization's expertise, while retaining the integrity of the overall technical capacity at headquarters.

In 2007, an Independent External Evaluation (IEE) of FAO, the first of its kind in the Organization's history, concluded that FAO was in a financial and programmatic crisis. It was criticized as being too conservative and slow to adapt, bureaucratic with declining organizational capacity, and with many imperiled core competencies. But the evaluation concluded that if the FAO did not exist it would need to be invented and consequently recommended the adoption of a new strategic framework, institutional culture change and reform of administrative and management systems.

The FAO management supported the conclusion that there was a need for reform involving a radical shift in management culture and spirit, the depoliticization of appointments, restoration of trust between staff and management, and setting strategic priorities. FAO member countries agreed to provide a one-time injection of US$42.6 million (€38.6 million) for a 3-year Immediate Plan of Action for "reform with growth", recommended by the IEE. Under the plan US$21.8 million was to be spent on overhauling financial procedures, hierarchies and human resource management (The Economic Times, 2008). In January 2012, the Director-General shifted the focus of the reform process to mainstreaming the reform into the work of the Organization.

Historically, FAO's culture has been relatively more top down than that of the World Bank with less delegation of authority to middle management or staff. A shortage of resources, outlined below, creates a tension between the provision of global public goods and country assistance, and the reduction of staff to meet repeated demands by donors has led to attrition and loss of technical skills and

[7]CSOs are non-governmental, not-for-profit organizations representing various groups of individuals. The term includes a range of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with issues-based agendas (e.g., the environment) or reflecting the interests of various groups, such as farmers, women, the scientific and technological community, youth, and children, indigenous peoples and their communities, business and industry, workers and trade unions, and local authorities (see, for example, GEF, 2017).

institutional memory. The World Bank also faces a similar challenge when both institutions need — and are expected to be — centers of excellence.

Of the total FAO planned budget for a bi-annual period of 2016–2017 of US$2.6 billion (meaning a US$1.3 billion annual budget) 39% comes from assessed contributions by member countries, while 61% is mobilized through voluntary donor support known as trust funds. The modest amount of assessed funding in relation to the Organization's vast public goods agenda poses a challenge: the large number of SDG indicators for which it has stewardship responsibility, including the collection of statistics and all aspects of early warning with regard to food and agriculture; setting norms and standards and their implementation in the areas of trade, pests and diseases; management; and the use of natural resources and their monitoring. For example, the FAO needs access to state of the art measurement tools using geographic information systems (GIS) to fulfill its mission, but it only has a small budget to perform this important function.

FAO's assessed contributions are also far more concentrated than in the other four organizations discussed in this chapter. As much as 79% comes from 15-member countries and as much as 88% from 25-member countries. The remaining 154 countries contribute only 11% of assessed contributions.[8]

With its heavy reliance on trust funds to fund programs (e.g., the FAO Trust Fund for Food Security and Food Safety), there is considerable debate about who drives the agenda. Typically, donors prefer to see FAO focus on its global public goods functions, whereas developing countries demand technical assistance. However, unlike in the World Bank, where lending resources are allocated among client countries using transparent relatively objective criteria, FAO's allocations of resources for technical assistance appear to be less subject to clear rules, leading to debate and criticism from donor countries.

The World Food Program (WFP)

Since the WFP was established in 1961 as an agency of the United Nations the world has seen the fastest growth in internal and external migration with the total displaced population standing at 65 million in 2017. The demand for humanitarian assistance greatly increases the need for resources and WFP role in the management of food emergencies.[9] WFP is the largest global agency dealing with food

[8]FAO. http://www.fao.org/about/strategic-planning/country-contributions/en/.

[9]50 million people in emergency settings were directly assisted by WFP in 2015, representing 79% of WFP's expenditures. 5,290 staff were deployed in that year in 12 concurrent emergencies, representing more than one-third of WFP's global workforce. (See http://www1.wfp.org/emergency-preparedness-and-response).

emergencies and unlike the World Bank, IFAD and FAO, but like the CGIAR (see below), it relies on voluntary contributions. Set up during a period of massive US food surpluses due to agricultural support policies, by 2005 those food surpluses had evaporated. In 2008, WFP redefined its mission from the provision of food aid to food assistance, using an expanded range of approaches and instruments which it had developed in preceding years, such as vouchers and cash transfers, nutrition interventions, local food purchase, and school feeding programs.

In its strategy for 2017–2021, the WFP is seeking to expand its role from implementer to enabler (i.e., creating capacity in developing countries to address emergencies). Under successive Directors General, the WFP has taken on many other challenges, such as the provision of safety nets for the poor (cash transfers, school feeding programs and its long standing signature support for public works programs), promoting nutrition through supplementary feeding programs, addressing climate change, resilience and the provision of agricultural development assistance generally by helping to target populations to make a transition from the receipt of food aid to rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.

A large share (37% in 2017) of WFP's funding has traditionally come from the United States. The next largest donors, the European Commission, Germany, the UK contribute slightly less than 10% each.[10] So the agency has been largely led by US nationals.

A 36-member Executive Board oversees the WFP's humanitarian and development food aid activities. This model, resembling that of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), rather than the one country, one vote model of FAO, gives its donors considerable voice and power. WFP's transition from a food aid agency to a food assistance agency has involved a major transformation in how it operates and what is expected of it; from an agency largely focusing on the logistics of movement of food for delivery to one which increasingly entails financial management at multiple levels to provide cash and conditional cash transfers, a tool in which WFP has become a leader. This transformation calls for very different skill mix. In addition, WFP is moving from delivering assistance to creating capability in the countries to address emergency assistance. This is relatively easy in politically stable countries but a particular challenge in conflict and fragile countries with weak institutions, which constitute WFP's clientele. With a combination of change in the functions and the increasing number of international emergencies, a broad menu of activities in resilience building in support of climate change and conflict, and a move upstream towards strategy and capacity building, not

[10]World Food Program (WFP). "Funding and Donors," as of March 19, 2017. http://www1.wfp.org/funding-and-donors.

surprisingly WFP's capabilities have been stretched to capacity and WFP's ability to handle several emergencies simultaneously poses major challenges. Audit results have indicated significant room for improvement in staff deployment to support the scaling up of emergency operations; the effectiveness of workforce planning; and other staff-related issues (WFP, 2017).

The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

One of the major responses to the food crises of the early 1970s, when international prices for grains increased substantially and there were famines in several countries in Asia and Africa, was the 1974 World Food Conference held under the auspices of the FAO. One of its significant outcomes was the establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in 1977, the 13th specialized agency of the United Nations.[11]

The purpose was to increase investment in food production in developing countries. IFAD also provided a vehicle for recycling petrodollars from the first oil shock for development purposes. An initial OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) financial commitment led to an agreement that gave OPEC countries a role in the governance of IFAD, including equal voting power (on the basis of one country one vote) among the three categories of members: the OECD countries, OPEC members, and developing countries. However, as IFAD's funding base has evolved, so too has the voting structure. Voting rights are distributed according to paid contributions. In 2017, the List A (primarily OECD members) category had 48.7% of votes, List B (primarily OPEC members) 12.5% and List C (developing countries) member countries 38.8%.[12]

A major development at the end of 2017 was the refusal of the United States to continue its contribution to IFAD as part of its 11th replenishment. The United States also cut funding to United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and withdrew from UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization). The implications of this diminished US presence in international cooperation are not yet clear. Except for two, all presidents of IFAD have come from OPEC countries and in recent elections they have been filled through an increasingly competitive process.

[11] See IFAD: Governance, https://www.ifad.org/web/guest/governance.

[12] International Fund for Agriculture (IFAD). Voting rights of IFAD Member States, as at 11 February 2017. https://webapps.ifad.org/members/gc/40/docs/GC-40-INF-2-Add-1.pdf.

IFAD's reforms in its financing structure have been relatively minor. OECD member countries are the predominant funders, but with a growing share, albeit small, from recipient members. The perceived weakness in the original funding model led to major reforms in governance: the switch from a one country one vote in 1995 to voting shares based on membership and levels of contribution and, in 2001, the appointment of the first President from a non-OPEC country. With the US withdrawal the voting shares will change again. Apart from a continued emphasis on co-financing, concerns over the funding model also led IFAD to initiate limited sovereign borrowing (2014) and a discussion (2017) on how IFAD could access capital markets to develop a larger capital base. With the exception of voting shares, the Governing Council and Executive Board retain the same membership categories, representation, functions, and authority as originally conceived in 1977. Reforms since 2007–2008 have been largely focused on operational and administrative activities, with an emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency in the business model, driven by the recommendations from external evaluations and reviews.

Within its focus on small-scale agriculture and its mandate for rural poverty alleviation IFAD, like the World Bank, has developed a broad menu of services to complement its investment function. These have included knowledge management, technical assistance, the development of partnerships and, in the case of farmer organizations and land tenure, advocacy work. It has also developed financial models to elicit financing from foundations and the private sector, including Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Program (ASAP); a climate change adaptation program for smallholder farmers, launched in 2012. Given both the complementary of this menu and the specificity of IFAD's approach, there is considerable scope for the development of synergies with the other "big five" organizations. The proximity of the other Rome-based agencies (RBA) already results in such cooperation. But there is scope for more, and the technical services of the FAO offer the most immediate potential. The World Bank Group remains key, both for the financial services currently offered and for the future growth of private sector financing and access to financial markets, to fulfill IFAD's role as a mobilizer of funds for rural development in line with its founding charter.

The Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)

The CGIAR (Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research) is a global partnership of 15 research centers and 11 system wide research programs (CGIAR Research Programs, CRPs) (7 Agri-Food Systems programs + 4 Global Integrating Programs), including three research support platforms which underpin the whole system, focusing on reducing poverty, enhancing food and nutrition security, and improving natural resources and ecosystem services.[13] The CGIAR has contributed substantially to increasing world food production since its inception in 1972 (Byerlee, 2016; Evenson and Gollin, 2003).

In the new millennium, CGIAR has undergone three major phases of reform in its governance, management and research in 2001–2003, 2008–2011, and 2015–2016 and modifications in light of lessons learned continue. The reforms have altered the organizational superstructure, while moving research downstream to satisfy donor demands for evidence of impacts on poverty and hunger, and in turn to satisfy taxpayers in funding countries. Perhaps an inadvertent result has been the erosion of CGIAR's traditional comparative advantage in germplasm research, with few resources to maintain and utilize its vast germplasm collection, while taking on tasks that National Agricultural Research Systems (NARSs) should be performing, but have been unable to, due to resource limitations. These have been created partly through under-investment in NARS, and partly through lack of significant reforms in the organizational structures, capacities and skill levels of NARS. Funding for the CGIAR stagnated until 2005–2006, more than doubled from US$426 million in 2006 to US$960 million in 2013, following significant increases in world food prices, but has since begun to decline again. Funding remains highly fragmented, short-term and unpredictable. The other four of the "big five" organizations are linear and relatively top down, and it is clear where organizational accountability rests. With numerous centers of power in the CGIAR it is not clear where accountability rests, although donors consider it is accountable to them for results.

The World Bank, as a major donor, has traditionally held the CGIAR chairmanship, which in turn signals confidence among other donors to fund the system. However, Bank funding has been reduced from US$50 million to US$30 million annually. Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research's biggest governance challenges have been twofold: The failure of donors to provide long-term unrestricted funding to harness the extraordinary technological changes taking place in the biological sciences in advanced countries, and to increase the ownership among emerging countries to take on more responsibility for financing, as well as helping to build capacity in weaker NARS in Africa.

Collaboration Among the Rome-based Agencies (RBA)

Collaboration among the three Rome-based agencies has been an issue of perennial interest to donors, with periodic reports prepared by the three organizations,

[13] CGIAR: http://www.cgiar.org/about-us/.

individually and collectively on how collaboration is or should be working (e.g., FAO, 2016). The interest in RBA collaboration has been strong because their missions are complementary (concessional financing for rural development; food relief; and the development of agricultural technical skills and global public goods). There have been proposals to integrate the three RBAs from time to time, the latest from the Aspen Institute, but this is unlikely to be workable, given their different origins, constitutions, financing, governance, organizational arrangements and modus operandi (Axworthy, 2015).

In 2002, a number of donor countries created the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) with the aim of providing assessments of the effectiveness of multilateral development organizations (see below for a more detailed discussion of the methodology used for evaluation). Some of the difficulties involved in integrating the activities of the RBAs are illustrated by previous evaluations. For example, in 2013, with respect to the WFP, MOPAN (2013, p. 6) noted that some donors are concerned that the shift from food aid to food assistance may extend WFP into development programming and result in the duplication of roles and responsibilities of other UN agencies, and that this expansion impinges on FAO's traditional responsibilities, in particular. As an emergency response organization, WFP has had a strong comparative advantage and well-recognized expertise in logistics. Due to the nature of its mission, it is an agile organization and is well connected with key donors, with the United States as its foremost champion. In contrast, FAO has had a long history of relatively centralized decision-making, with little delegation of authority to middle managers, even though FAO has had more staff employed on a long-term basis, whereas most of the WFP hires tend to be on short-term contracts.

Over the years, donors and critics of FAO (e.g., CGD, 2015) have expressed concerns about FAO involvement in small projects with governments through its Technical Cooperation Program (TCP) rather than confining itself to the provision of global public goods (GPGs). FAO's assessed contributions are increasingly ring-fenced for GPG functions with voluntary contributions supporting donors' preferred activities. In contrast, there has been relatively little overt criticism of WFP's vastly expanding mission in areas where it has little expertise, e.g., in its transition from dealing with food emergencies to rehabilitation of land rights, seed supply and reconstruction. Consequently there has been increasing overlap between WFP's and FAO's activities in the field. While FAO has much of the technical expertise, WFP commands greater financial resources, FAO's annual extra-budgetary resources of about US$800 million pale before WFP's US$5 billion to US$6 billion voluntary contributions annually (although some of WFP's contributions are in kind and most serve emergency needs).

IFAD, with its well-established lending programs, agrees in advance to provide client countries with medium to long-term financial and grant assistance. In addition to IFAD providing some project formulation through its Investment Center at a country level, FAO has provided technical assistance to IFAD programs, as part of agreed project implementation arrangements. WFP has provided parallel support for FAO projects through its food for work programs. However, such interactions are limited. As IFAD has increasingly moved into assisting countries with adaptation to climate change, its focus on monitoring agricultural activities has increased, and its collaboration in the field with FAO has also increased.

RBA collaborative experience so far demonstrates that agencies have vastly different missions and mandates and that collaboration works better at the global level rather than at the country level. Examples are the preparation of reports on food security, which are largely initiated by FAO but co-prepared and signed by WFP and IFAD, joint support for organizing conferences through the Committee on World Security or meetings such as the Second International Conference on Nutrition (ICN2) held in Rome in November 2014, and providing administrative collaboration in travel and security management.

Collaboration at the regional and country levels remains weak, even though, all RBAs have country operations and sometimes share offices. IFAD's regional presence is limited to a small number of regional grants with the majority of IFAD's concessional financing focused at the country level. Cooperation at the country level will improve only if member countries, while recognizing the different operational modalities of RBAs, both support and demand this for specific initiatives if dedicated programs do not compete with already stretched budgets for current programming, and if there is a strong expectation from donors that each organization shows results on the ground.

Evaluations of Effectiveness of the Big Five

Donor evaluations of international organizations have proliferated, as concerns about aid effectiveness and accountability to taxpayers in donor countries (particularly OECD member countries) has increased. Such assessments seem to have become necessary to justify the provision of aid, but they typically provide short-term snapshots, and the sum of their benefits is not commensurate with the resources spent on them. Besides, they do not address the larger strategic issues of under-funding of global or national public goods, and the steps needed to make international organizations more effective.

The Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) mentioned earlier is a network of 18 bilateral donor countries that contribute 95% of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to and through the multilateral system, and that share concerns about the effectiveness of multilateral organizations and accountability to their taxpayers.[14] The countries include (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The assessments tend to show that international organizations generally seem to be working well and, in most cases, better than their bilateral aid counterparts (Birdsall *et al*., 2010).

Under the most recent MOPAN methodology used in the 2015–2016 cycle of assessments answers were sought to the following questions:

Relevance: do multilateral organizations have sufficient understanding of the needs and demands they face in the present, and may face in the future?
Efficiency: are the organizations using their assets and comparative advantages to maximum effect in the present and are they prepared for the future?
Effectiveness: are their systems, planning and operations fit for purpose? Are they geared in terms of operations to deliver on their mandate?
Impact/Sustainability: are the organizations delivering and demonstrating relevant and sustainable results in a cost-efficient way?

Performance indicators (KPI) are employed for the following areas:

Strategic management: clear strategic direction geared to key functions, intended results and integration of relevant cross-cutting priorities.
Operational management: assets and capacities organized behind strategic direction and intended results, to ensure relevance, agility, and accountability.
Relationship management: engaging in inclusive partnerships to support relevance, to leverage effective solutions and to maximize results.
Knowledge management: systems geared to managing and accounting for development and humanitarian results and the use of performance information, including evaluation and lesson-learning.
Results: achievement of relevant, inclusive and sustainable contributions to humanitarian and development results in an efficient way.

[14]MOPAN has assessed 27 organizations since 2003 using three different approaches (Annual Survey, Common Approach, and MOPAN 3.0). Their selection follows a dual-track process of: (a) the identification of Member preferences through a process orchestrated by the MOPAN Secretariat and (b) a sampling process, based on clear criteria, conducted by a professional evaluation company (IOD PARC). MOPAN members select what organizations to assess and when on a consensus-basis.

Due to the different mandates and structures among organizations, MOPAN does not compare or rank them in terms of effectiveness.

In addition to assessments through MOPAN many donor countries conduct their own assessments (e.g., Australia, Norway, and the United Kingdom). It is difficult to compare the results. Each donor country applies the same criteria across organizations, regardless of differences in the organizational objectives, e.g., the World Bank, IDA, and IFAD are investment Banks. FAO, as a standard setting and knowledge organization, should be evaluated using the same criteria applied to UNCTAD and WTO. Learning from earlier evaluations, the criteria of some donors (e.g., DFID and UK Aid) have changed over time, and the resulting assessments are not comparable. While the desire on the part of donors to demonstrate accountability in the use of taxpayer resources is understandable, there has been a proliferation in the number of assessment performed (Achamkulangare and Bartsiotas, 2017). For example, 205 bilateral assessments were performed by members of the OECD's development assistance committee (DAC) during 2012–2014, necessitating the creation of a specialized unit to handle the process (the Joint Inspection Unit).

In an evaluation of the donor review process, Achamkulangare and Bartsiotas (2017) note several shortcomings, including:

- Lack of familiarity by external consultants engaged by donors with financial and related rules governing the use of funds by international organizations and confidentiality conflicts in the provision of information to reviewers.
- Underuse by reviewers of basic information already in the public domain (e.g., annual reports; reports to governing bodies).
- Lack of an established practice for publicizing donor reviews or for sharing the results among donor countries, possibly leading to needless duplication.
- The need for organizations to devote considerable staff resources to providing information and documentation to reviewers, explaining regulatory frameworks and procedures, planning and conducting detailed senior-level interviews and meetings for review teams, and in providing comments and responses to reviewers' reports.

The evaluation notes "transactions costs associated with these donor assessments may divert substantial resources from the United Nations system organizations' core activities" (p. v). The suggestion is made that donors should agree on the use of a single assessment mechanism (e.g., MOPAN) in order to avoid wasteful duplication.

Among the big five organizations, the CGIAR is less frequently evaluated by donors than the other four although CGIAR conducts a plethora of its own evaluations, perhaps because it is not an inter-governmental organization in a strict sense of the term. Furthermore, governance of the CGIAR is by far the most complex among the five. The World Bank, FAO, and the CGIAR all practice matrix management (systems that cross traditional vertical business units) with dual reporting responsibility. But unlike the four "unitary" organizations, where the CEOs (Presidents in the case of the WBG and IFAD, the Directors General of FAO and Executive Directors of WFP) are accountable for corporate performance, in the case of the CGIAR, a network with distributed governance with 15 centers and numerous System wide Research Programs with boards of their own, it is unclear who is responsible for system level performance.

Only the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have assessed the CGIAR, concluding that it performs well. Among the remaining four organizations, the WBG and the WFP generally get better ratings than the FAO, in part because FAO's global public goods functions are not as easy to evaluate as the investment operations of the World Bank and IFAD. However, donor reports stress that FAO's internal processes, management and effectiveness have been improving. MOPAN, e.g., assessed FAO in 2011 and again in 2014, and noted an improvement in virtually every performance indicator. In four important areas linked to delivery — corporate strategy based on clear mandate, country focus on results, supporting national plans and contributing to policy dialogue — the rating was raised from "inadequate or below" to "strong or above." MOPAN 2014 did identify two areas of continued concern — results-based budgeting and management of human resources.

Conclusions

Whereas bilateral donor evaluations of individual international organizations, reported above, have focused on micro issues of organizational effectiveness, analysts concerned with aid have raised broad strategic questions about the extent to which specific international organizations have evolved to keep up with the challenges of the 21st century. For example, Ahluwalia *et al*. (2016), Birdsall (2014 , 2017), Birdsall and Morris (2016), and Ravallion (2015) all argue that the World Bank needs to be more ambitious in identifying and addressing the most pressing knowledge gaps, that its lending operations should be driven by knowledge of the binding constraints on poverty reduction in specific country contexts, and that the Bank's present country-based model needs to be supplemented by one with greater capacity for supporting the provision of global public goods.

There are strong arguments that the Bank should modify or abandon its traditional project based model of country assistance to focus increased greater attention on the provision of global and regional public goods, such as agricultural and solar technologies, containing global public bads such as cross border spill overs of Avian Flu, Ebola, and climate change, on improving governance so that conflict is contained, and on promoting regional integration. Similarly FAO should focus more on the provision of more and better quality data to improve policy-making at the national and international levels (see Chapter 16).

But there are also contradictions. Birdsall (2014, blog) argues, "the bank is well past its heyday as a major supplier of funds to developing countries, and faces an existential threat of growing irrelevance and obscurity as rising incomes in big emerging markets reduce the demand for and logic of the bank's country loan model." The Development Committee Report (2015), to which reference was made at the beginning of this chapter states the counter-view that investment finance both for the provision of national as well as global public goods is a major constraint on development, generating a need to move from billions of dollars to trillions to address the issues. The emerging countries will probably seek to occupy the space in international finance if the World Bank and other international organizations created by western countries in the Post World War II era are not willing and able to increase the voice and participation of developing countries in their governance; if the traditional organizations do not grow with the changing times and do not bring the skill mix needed to be responsive to the needs of developing countries, where knowledge base and capacity has increased. Without such changes in global governance, the SDGs and climate change challenges are unlikely to be met and international governance is likely to become more balkanized as groups of countries seek to create their own institutions to address issues that have previously been addressed multilaterally. Such a fractionated outcome will not be positive for the future of the world.

Agendas of all five organizations have expanded, some call it mission creep, others a need to respond to a more complex development agenda. The organizations have tried to deal with the broad range of issues by spreading themselves thinly rather than specializing and turning to others to provide services. Nobel Laureate (in 1991) Ronald Coase in his work on the firm (Coase, 1937) asked an important question: when should firms produce services internally and when should they turn to others by developing effective supply chains? The big five organizations in partnership with others could build bridges through development emergencies, turning to others, who have the skills and resources as needed to address the various stages. In response to the 2007–2008 food crisis the five organizations worked closely together to provide an emergency response to 30 countries (World Bank, 2012; IEG, 2013). That showed what they can do if they cooperated regularly and effectively. They learnt about each other's comparative advantages, their procedures, strengths, and weaknesses. But they soon reverted to their old ways.

FAO is under-funded to be able to deliver its vast agenda. Even with the latest revision of assessments on member contributions to reflect their economic growth, the resources available are insufficient to strengthen FAO as a center of excellence. CGIAR's funding is fragmented and unpredictable. It could return to its comparative advantage, if the World Bank and IFAD would lend more to developing countries, particularly those with the greatest incidence of hunger and poverty in support of agricultural research and development. Demands on the WFP for emergency assistance exceed its capacity and the World Bank and IFAD can potentially work with the WFP to scale up and help countries make the transition from emergency response to long-term development through their assistance. This would call for inter-agency cooperation involving leadership of all five organizations and their donor supporters.

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